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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ARTHUR 0. NAUMAN,

Plaintiff and Appellant
vs.
HAROLD K. BEECHER AND ASSOCIATES, a Utah corporation, and HAROLD
K. BEECHER, an Individual

Case No.

10609

Defendants and Respondents
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a complaint by a foreman employee
of the general contractor, Christiansen Brothers, Inc.,
against a third party, Harold K. Beecher and Associates,
a Utah corporation, the architect, and against one of its
employees, Harold K. Beecher, an individual, for personal
injuries suffered in a cave-in of an excavation.
The complaint is in two Counts, the first ex deL1cto and
the second ex contractu.
Neither of the two alleged actions contain the necessary allegations against the architect for alleged failure
"to meet the standard of learning, skill and conduct ordinarily possessed by architects - practicing in the same
or similar localities".
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Appellant's complaint merely alleges a failure to ex.
ercise a discretionary judgment of the architect to stop
work on a utility tunnel being constructed in a trench
excavation as an insurer or guarantor against an accident
to any employee of the general contractor from a possible
cave-in of the excavation.
The two alleged actions also involve the legal relationship of co-employees - two independent contractors _
the architect and the general contractor and their co.
employees engaged in the same common project, namely,
the construction and supervision of construction of the
tracting owners, Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County.
The nature of the case need be further particularized
by the fact that the contracting owners are not private
but public corporations, being an incorporated municipality, and a county (a political subdivision) of the State of
Utah, each of which has its own continuously employed
engineer and his staff with supervisory powers over the
architect. (Par. 13, Architect's Contract, R. 161.)
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial Court dismissed the complaints of the plain·
tiff with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT BY RESPONDENTS ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to uphold the judgment of dismissal
with prejudice of plaintiff's complaints, COUNTS I and
II against both defendants-respondents.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Over a period of nearly ten months, from May 26, 1965
to March 16, 1966, plaintiff filed four different complaints, the last of which, entitled second amended complaint (R. 146-163) is material here.
The plaintiff incorporates in his statement of facts
(App. Brief, pp. 3 to 12) excerpts from the contract of the
general contractor, Christiansen Brothers, Inc., and from
the agreement of the architect, Harold K. Beecher and
Associates, a Utah corporation, (Exhibit A, R. 156-163)
with the joint owners. These quotations from said contract and agreement are believed to be accurate.
The total excavation to allow construction of the utility tunnel was about 600 feet. For safety reasons, the contractor would excavate about 100 to 125 feet at one time,
construct the utility tunnel in the excavation and then
backfill that part of the excavation. The excavation had
been backfilled from the east-westward for about twothirds of the distance without any cave-in up to October 17, 1963.
In appellant's supplemental statement of facts (App.
Brief, pp. 35-37) under the heading "ARGUMENT", appellant's counsel goes outside of the record and inappropriately gives his own statements as to what (in his opinion) the evidence will show in plaintiff's favor. He does,
however, admit to one fact, which the complaint does not
allege, and with which defendants agree, that as required
by paragraph 7 of the architect's agreement, the architect
did appoint a qualified on-site inspector as its special
agent to do the daily inspecting and supervising within
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the scope of the architect's agreement when properly interpreted in connection with the contractor's contract.
The complaint does not allege that the qualified on-site
inspector failed to perform any of his duties of inspection
and supervision or that he performed them in a negligent
manner.
We will not concede that the statements of plaintiff's
counsel in his appellate brief of what, in his opinion, the
evidence will show will substitute for the omission of
necessary allegations in a complaint

1

(a) of the scope of an architect's duty to do what
qualified architects practicing in the same or
similar localities would have done under similar
circumstances, and
(b) of a neglect of the architect to perform its duty
as thus defined.
Appellant's counsel states, again outside the record,
that on one occasion a conference was had among the
representatives of the contractor and of Salt Lake City,
Salt Lake County, the architect and the on-site inspectors
of Salt Lake City and of the architect. (App. Brief, pp.
35-36).
Appellant's counsel does not state when the conference
was held nor what it led to. Such a conference was held
on or about September 15, 1963. Two highly material
facts, omitted from plaintiff's brief, are that a question
was raised as to whether the contractor's manner of exca·
vation and shoring which had proved safe thus far should
be made more safe, and as a result of such conference, a
complaint was made by the City Engineer's office and the

1

1

5
architect to the State Industrial Commission that the
shoring of the excavation was judged to be inadequate at
that time. This resulted in an official inspection and in
continuing official surveillance by the State Industrial
Commission of safety measures at the excavation.
The affidavit of John W. Holmes, safety inspector for
the State Industrial Commission of Utah, which is in the
record (R. 175-177), states, in substance and effect, that
as a result of a complaint made to the State Industrial
Commission of Utah the shoring in said excavation
was inspected on September 17, 1963 and was judged by
Mr. Holmes to be inadequate to comply with the Safety
Regulations of the State Industrial Commission for excavations.
Mr. Holmes immediately ordered work on the utility
tunnel stopped. He ordered, on the spot, that the general
contractor immediately and continuously thereafter provide sufficient shoring of the excavation to make it safe
for workmen, and that an escape ladder be put into the
excavation. (R. 175-176).
Mr. Holmes reported his findings and action to Casper
A. Nelson, the Commissioner of the State Industrial Commission in charge of Safety Regulations and inspections.
Commissioner Nelson then prepared and sent a letter to
Christiansen Brothers, Inc. and included a copy of the
Regulations of the State Industrial Commission regarding methods for providing safe excavations, (R. 177),
sloping of side walls or adequate shoring or a combination
of both methods which, in the judgment of the State Safety Inspector, would prove adequate for reasonable safety
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precautions (R. 177). Copies of the letter were also sent
to the project foreman and the architect.
State Inspector, John W. Holmes, ordered the method
of additional shoring of the excavation as the safe method '
to be used by the contractor. Mr. Holmes again inspected
the excavation on September 18, 1963; found that his
orders for adequate shoring had been complied with and
allowed work to proceed on the utility tunnel.
State Inspector Holmes did inform the contractor .•
that he would return for later inspections. He did not
inform anyone when those inspections would be made.

l

The fact is that State Inspector Holmes did, as late as '
October 4, 1963 make a surprise inspection of the excava·
tion and found that the pattern of shoring which he had (
earlier ordered and approved as a safe manner of exca· I
vation with the degr7e of sloping which he had also ap· ,
proved was being followed and that the shoring of the
excavation was in compliance with the Safety Regulations of the State Industrial Commission of Utah.
Appellants' counsel, at page 40 of their brief, make an
untrue statement in characterizing Mr. Arthur 0. Nau·
man as an "uninformed employee". Mr. Cassity knows or
should recollect that Mr. Nauman had been an employee
of Christiansen Brothers Inc., for many years and for
about four years had been one of its prudent, competent
and trusted foremen; that Mr. Nauman was foreman over
the excavation and construction of the utility tunnel on
October 16th and 17th 1963; that if the excavation were
unsafe on said days, it was his primary, special duty to
make it safe. Therefore if there were any negligence in

j
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failing to make the excavation safe then PLAINTIFF
SEEKS RECOVERY FOR HIS OWN WRONG.
Plaintiff Arthur 0. Nauman is a U.S. Veteran. Shortly
after the accident, he was taken to the U. S. Veteran's
Hospital in Long Beach, California where he received
special physotherapy treatment for about two and one
half years. He was transferred to the U.S. Veteran's Hospital in Salt Lake City this spring where he is now receiving, and will continue to receive, the best of care.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
MR. HAROLD K. BEECHER IS NOT A PARTY TO THE
ARCHITECT'S CONTRACT AND THE ALLEGATIONS
OF THE COMPLAINT ARE INSUFFICIENT TO RAISE
THE QUESTION OF "ALTER EGO".

Plaintiff-appellant alleges in paragraph 2 of his complaints that "the defendants entered into an agreement
with Salt Lake City Corporation - to provide professional architectural services," etc. Apparently appellant has
abandoned his claim that Harold K. Beecher is a contracting party. Although appellant's counsel briefed and
argued this claim before the trial court, he does not present any such argument in the appellate brief.
The architect's contract, Exhibit A to the complaints,
recites that it is between Salt Lake City Corporation and
Harold K. Beecher and Associates. It is signed, "Harold
K. Beecher and Associates, Incorporated, By /s/ Harold
K. Beecher, President" and "Harold K. Beecher and As-
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sociates, 'Architect' By /s/ Harold K. Beecher" and attested by "/s/ Harold K. Beecher, Secretary".
The use of the corporate name twice is merely repetitious. In both instances the word "By" preceding Mr.
Beecher's name shows a signing in a representative capacity. Section 1342 of 19 Am. Jur. 2nd, Corporation,
reads in part:

1

A correct form of signature which is uniformly regarded as imposing no personal liability upon the i
officer signing is that of a signature containing the I
corporate name followed by the word 'per' or 'by' ~
which in turn is followed by the name of the cor- I
porate officer.
'
Paragraph 1 of the complaints allege that "during said
times alleged herein, defendant, Harold K. Beecher, an
individual - was an officer, director and general manager of defendant corporation and was in charge of and
had general supervision over the defendant corporation's
operations under that certain architect's Agreement referred to in paragraph 2 hereof". However, as pointed out
in the foregoing statement of facts, the architect did not
appoint its President as its special agent to perform daily
inspection and supervision work, but appointed a qualified on-site inspector to perform those duties.

t
r

The foregoing allegation does not raise an issue of
whether Mr. Harold K. Beecher was the "alter ego" of
the corporation.
Proof that a person has absolute control over affairs of
a corporation does not establish that he is the "alter ego"
of the corporation. (General American Life Insurance Co. ,
vs. Anderson 1942 D. C. Ky. 46 F. Supp. 189, 195.)
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To establish the "alter ego" doctrine, it must be shown
that the stockholders disregard the entity of the corporation, made the corporation a mere conduit for the transaction of their own private business, and that the separate individualities of the corporation ceased to exist.
(Sefton vs. San Diego Trust & Savings Bank 1940, Cal.
App. 106 P. 2d 974, 984).
In conclusion on POINT I, the judgment of dismissal
with prejudice of the complaints against Harold K.
Beecher, an individual should be affirmed.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF APPELLANT HAS NO VALID CLAIM
FOR RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANTS ON HIS
CLAIM TO BE A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY UNDER COUNT II OF HIS COMPLAINT.
(A) ARCHITECT'S CONTRACT WITH OWNER
FOR SUPERVISION IS FOR BENEFIT OF OWNER
ALONE UNLESS CLEARLY INTENDED OTHERWISE.
Mr. I. Vernon Werbin in his 1961 Volume on Law for
Contractors, Architects and Engineers, pages 38-45 points
out that contracts of an architect with the owner for
supervision are made for the express benefit of the owner
and that negligence which results in a defective end result whether from defective plans or specifications or
from failure to exercise reasonable judgment and effort
to secure compliance with his plans and specifications
gives the employer the cause of action for breach of such
contract. Lindberg v. Hodgens, 152 N.Y. Supp. 229.
Schwartz v. Underhill, 1950, 95 Cal. 9.2d 700, 213, P. 2d
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516. Hill v. Polar Pantries 219 S. C. 263, 64 S. E. 2d 855.

The duty of an architect to his client is to exercise that
degree of reasonable care and diligence exercised by men
of his profession in the community where he practices; in
examining the site, in preparation of plans and specifications, and in supervision of the work, to secure results of
the work in accordance with the plans and specifications.
He does not give any guarantee as to the results of the
work. He is not an insurer. White v. Pallay, 119 Or. 97,
247 P. 316; Henon v. Vernon, 68 Pa. Super. 608. There is
no allegation of any such duty in the complaint.
(B) ARCHITECT'S CONTRACT DOES NOT MAKE
A GIFT OF EITHER A CONTRACT OR TORT ACTION TO PLAINTIFF.
Diligent research has disclosed no appellate court decision holding that an architect may be sued successfully
on a claim for relief as a donee or incidental beneficiary.
If an architect should contract for a separate and adequate fee for inspection and supervision above the usual
and customary architect's fee, then the problem of a
creditor beneficiary would arise. This case does not present a creditor beneficiary issue Even creditor beneficiary contracts rest on clearly stated contractural intent as is shown by the Utah case infra.
The donee and incidental third party beneficiary cases
are found in the annotations of the Restatement In The
Courts - Permanent Edition 1932-44 and in the 1948 and
1954 Supplements of Cases under the Restatement of
Contracts. Section 145 contains the annotations under the
heading: Beneficiaries under promises to the United
States, a State or a municipality.

1
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The cases show that the alleged beneficiary may recover against contractors in only two situations: (a) if
the affirmative act is inherently dangerous, or (b) if the
act violates the absolute duty to maintain support to a
neighbors land or to his land with improvements.
The owner of realty may recover from a contractor for
damages done to his premises under a contract between
the contractor and a city wherein the contractor promises
to pay "all damages done by blasting." Mourea v. Rhude,
1940, 209 Minn. 53, 55, 295 N. W. 304, 306. Wilson v. Oliver
Costich Company, 1939, 231 App. Div. 346, 351, 237 N. Y.
Supp. 131, 136; aff'd., 256 N. Y. 629, 177 N. E. 169. Del
Pizzo v. Middle West Coast Construction Company, 1941,
146 P. Super. 345, 348, 22A. 2d 79, 80. Blasting in law is an
inherently dangerous act, no matter how carefully done.
The excavation of an open deep trench does not come
within the tort doctrine of an inherently dangerous activity, as will be shown by later cases.
Except for third party beneficiary actions allowing
against contractors as above stated, the cases are uniform
that only the contracting owner, in privity of contract,
may recover for breach of the contract.
The New York case of Whitmore v. Fago, 1949, 93 N. Y.
Supp. 2d, 672, 686, is in point. In that case, the contractor
was performing a contract with the United States War
Department in building a retaining wall on the Addison
Flood Control Project. The contract called for installation
of "sheeting and shoring" to be placed "for protection of
the work and adjacent property". The contract also recited that "the contractor should be responsible for all
damages to property occurring as a result of negligence
in connection with the work".
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The Court held that the claimed donee beneficiary action would not lie. The Court said in referring to the
above contract provisions:
I cannot read in them that in intention for a direct
benefit of the plaintiff necessary before a stranger
can sue for breach of contract as voiced by the United
States Supreme Court: 'Before a stranger can avail
himself of the exceptional privilege of suing for a
breach of an agreement to which he is not a party, he
must at least show that it was intended for his direct
benefit. German Alliance Insurance Company v.
Home Water Supply Company, 226 U.S. 220, 33 S. Ct.
32, 35, 57 L. Ed. 195, 42 L. R. A., N. S. 1000.'
In accord is another comparatively recent case, United
Dispatch Inc. v. E. J. Albert Company, 1950, 135 W. Va. '
34, 62 S. E. 2d, 289, 295. A clause in the contract provided
that the "contractor should be responsible" for damage
to persons or property" as a result of his fault or negligence in connection with the prosecution of the work".
The Court held that no third party beneficiary action
existed and reversed the Trial Court dismissing the ac·
tion. The Court said regarding plaintiff's claim:
We must consider the entire contract as well as the
particular portions thereof relied upon by the plain·
tiff. Upon such consideration of the entire contract
in all of its multitudinous details we can reach no
conclusion except that it was made for the sole benefit of the contracting parties.
Accord: Whitmore v. Fargo, 93 N.Y. S. 2d, 686, and
semble accord: Kelly v. Richards & Willis-Overland Co.,
1939, 95 Ut. 560, 83 P. 2d 731, 129 A.L.R. 164.
Dismissal of COUNT II of plaintiff's complaint for fail·
ure to state a cause of action should be affirmed.
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POINT III
THE CONTRACTS SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO
GIVE CONTRACTOR THE USUAL RIGHTS AND
DUTIES OF AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND
THE EXTRAORDINARY RIGHT TO STOP WORK REQUIRES JOINT COOPERATIVE JUDGMENT

Plaintiff emphasizes one small phrase at the close of
paragraph 7 of the architect's agreement on "General Administration" which, out of context, says that the architect's on-site inspector has a duty "to supervise all phases of the work being done". This merely means supervision to determine that each item of construction complies with the specifications of the architect.
The foundation of tort liability is that every person
should be liable for his own wrong, but not for the wrong
of another. If a person does an affirmative act which foreseeably, to an ordinary prudent man under the circumstances, will likely cause harm to another or the property
of another, then liability for such harm is imposed by law.
The wisdom of ago-old law has created a few rules of
absolute liability which include the escape of wild animals or impounded water causing harm, the use of an inherently dangerous instrumentality or affirmatively engaging in an ultrahazardous activity like blasting (but
not for making an excavation) except where the excavation withdraws lateral support of the soil from a neighbors property causing damage. (Rest. of Torts, Section
520 et. seq., on absolute liability for acts including ultrahazardous activity.)
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. ~ara.graph. 13 of the architect's agreement for super.
v1s1on is subJect to the superior control of the City En·.
neer and County Engineer in every respect. It reads: gi
13. SUPERVISION. The City Engineer will represent
the owner, Salt Lake City Corporation with respect
to the agreement, and the architect shall perform and
conduct all required services under his direction and
supervision R. 161) . (Italics supplied)
An independent contractor is a person engaged in an
independent profession, vocation or calling in which he
agrees to do a piece of work according to his own means
and methods and free from control by the other contracting party, except as to the result of the work.

Christiansen Brothers, Inc. was the independent contractor agreeing to construct the Metropolitan Hall of
Justice Building according to its own means, methods
and techniques of performance.

Properly interpreted from all provisions of the architects and the contractors agreements it will be seen that ,
the extraordinary and unusual right to stop work must
be done by joint, cooperative judgment of the City Engineer, the Countny Engineer and the architect.
The contractor agrees specifically in certain para·
graphs of its contract to take all necessary precautions
for the safety of its employees (Special Conditions Sec·
tion of the Specifications, pars. 1 (b) and 17 (a), R. 149).
The provisions of the contractor's contract hereafter
mentioned which refer to supervision by the architect
are phrases of limitation. They state that the architect
will supervise construction as a cooperative, joint activ·
ity with the City and County Engineers.
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Paragraph 3 (b) of the General Conditions Section of
the Specifications states that Harold K. Beecher and Associates
will direct the supervision of construction and is acting in cooperation with the City Engineer and County Engineer as outlined above in paragraph 3 and
3 (a) (R. 148) . (Italics added.)

The Court will surely take judicial notice that provisions are common in contracts for the construction of
large buildings which provide that all work and materials
are subject to inspection and rejection by the architect
if the kind or quality of materials or equipment, or the
completed work, does not conform to the detailed specifications.
Paragraph 1 of the architect's agreement states that
among other duties, the architect's "professional services"
shall include "necessary conferences" and "the general
administration of the construction contracts" regarding
'architectural, structural, plumbing, heating, electrical
and other mechanical work" (R. 156). This requires daily
supervision not as to means or methods but as to the results of the work. The phrase "supervise all phases of the
work being done" clearly means this kind of supervision.
By reversing the position of the phrase which plaintiff
requests should be interpreted in its broadest sense, we
get the true meaning of paragraph 7 of the architect's
agreement when also interpreted in the light of the foregoing contractural provisions. The sentence will then
read:
The architect shall furnish "a qualified on-site inspector to supervise and inspect all phases of the work" "to
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determine the quality and acceptance of the material
and/or equipment proposed to be used in the facilities
being constructed" (R. 159). This obviously would include materials and equipment, (tieing back to para.
grap~ 1 supra) including also "structural, plumbing,
heatmg, electrical and other mechanical work", etc. The
clear purpose is not to control the general contractor as
to means, methods and techniques, but daily supervision
to see that the end result conforms to the drawings and
specifications.

POINT IV
CONSTRUCTING AN OPEN EXCAVATION IS NOT
ULTRAHAZARDOUS ACTIVITY LIKE BLASTING OR
REMOVING THE STEEL SUPPORTS FROM A GYMNASIUM ROOF
The general rule is "that an owner or employer is not
responsible for the negligence of an independent contractor". Werbin, Legal Cases for Contractors, Architects
and Engineers, 1961, page 4.
However, Mr. Werbin points out an exception to the
general rule that the owner is liable for the
failure of an independent contractor to exercise due
care in respect to the performance of the work which
is inherently or intrinsically dangerous. Inherently
or intrinsically dangerous work has been variously
defined, usually to the effect that it is work necessarily attended with danger, no matter how skillfully
or carefully it is performed. Ibid, page 6.
The annotation in 23 A.L.R. 1084 reviews the various
terminology used by the different courts to detennine

1
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whether the particular fact situation presents an "ultrahazardous activity", as is claimed by the plaintiff in this
case (par.14 of complaint, R.150).
The statement of the legal test is rather uniformily
worded as follows: Work "in its nature inherently dangerous to others, however carefully performed". Ga. 13
S.E., 277, 84 S.E. 451.
"Work, necessarily attended with danger, however
skillfully and carefully performed". Ill., 20 N.E. 33, N.Y.
32 N.E. 1052, N. C. 45 S. E. 654, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 851, and
Wash., 113 Pac.1093.
It is common knowledge that injuries may happen in

any construction project. "Many are attended with great
danger if carelessly managed although with proper care
they are not specially hazardous". Lafferty v. N. S. Gypsum Company, 1910, 83 Kan. 349, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 930,
111 Pac. 498.
A case squarely in point follows: Where a trench was
dug by steam shovel and operator hired by owner of
property for that purpose, such work was not of a kind
that contained an unreasonable or peculiar risk of bodily
harm to workmen in the trench, recognizable by the
property owner, and the owner was not liable for injuries
to an employee of the plumbing contractor sustained as
result of subsequent collapse of the side of the trench.
Gibilterra v. Rosemawer Homes, 1955, 19 N. J. 166, 115
A. 2d 553.
A construction company which was constructing an extension to a building for a third party and had entered
into a subcontract with a partnership for construction of
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"caissons" necessary for the foundation of the extension
was under no obligation to change the method of doing
work or to warn plaintiff of that which was self-evident
as respects company's liability for injuries received whe~
plaintiff fell into a hole which had been dug for the
"caisson" while on the premises looking for employment.
Forgione v. Frankini Construction Company, 1941, 398
Mass. 29, 30 N.E. 2d 819. The condition of the excavation
in this Nauman case was self-evident.
An open trench is a danger which a mere licensee must
avoid at his peril. Coleman v. Renesch, 1926, 18 Ohio App.
177. And the excavation of an open trench is not an ultrahazardous activity for which absolute liability results in
tort law if an injury occurs by a cave-in. Restatement of
Torts, Sec. 520 et. seq.
POINT V
THE ARCHITECT HAD A RIGHT TO RELY ON THE
JUDGMENT OF THE STATE SAFETY INSPECTOR
AS THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY IN DETERMINING
WHAT CONSTITUTED ADEQUADE SHORING AND
WAS HELPLESS TO REQUIRE GREATER SAFETY
PRECAUTIONS THAN THOSE APPROVED BY THE
STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.
The owners' contract with the contractor required that
the contractor
"take all necessary precautions for the safety of the
public and employees on the work and shall comply
with all applicable provisions of Federal, STATE and
municipal Safety Laws and Building Codes to prevent accident or injury to persons on, about or ad·

1
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jacent to the premises where the work is being performed. (Par. 1 (b) of the Special Conditions Section
of the contractor's contract - R. 149) .
An architect having participated in securing the official
judgment of the Safety Inspector of the State Industrial
Commission was entitled to rely upon the impartial judgment which the State Safety Inspector made as to what
constituted adequate shoring to comply with the Safety
Regulations of that official body. (See Affidavit of State
Safety Inspector John W. Holmes, R. 175-177). More than
that, the architect was bound by the pattern of shoring
which was officially approved. The architect could not
compel the contractor to use greater safety precautions
than the pattern of shoring approved by the State Industrial Commission, which was followed beginning and
after September 18, 1963.
Having made that bona fide judgment, the architect
should not be liable for such judgment on a claim of nonfeasance wherein the tort law of ultrahazardous activity
does not apply.
"The doctrine that where a public officer invested
with discretion exercises his judgment in matters
brought before him, he is usually given immunity
from liability to persons who may be injured as a
result of an erroneous or mistaken decision, however,
erroneous his judgment may be, provided the acts
complained of are done with the scope of the officers
authority and without willfullness, malice or corruption, - has been employed to protect from liability
an architect whose plans and specifications have been
approved by a public officer." Day v. National U. S.
Radiator Corporation, 241, La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660.
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POINT VI
HAROLD K. BEECHER AND ASSOCIATES, A UTAH
CORPORATION, AND HAROLD K. BEECHER ARE
IMMUNE FROM TORT LIABILITY UNDER SECTION
35-1-62, UCA, 1953.
To correct the earlier law which forbade a third party
action by an injured employee who elected to take workmen's compensation (Hamilton v. Commissioner of Finance, 1945, 108 Ut. 574, 162 P. 2d 58) the legislature
amended the Workmen's Compensation Law of Utah in
1945 to allow an action by an injured employee against a
third party provided the parties were not engaged "in the
same employment". Sec. 35-1-62, 1953 of the N.C.A.
reads as follows:
When any injury or death from which compensation

is payable under this title shall have been caused by
the wrongful action or neglect of another person not
in the same employment and the injured employee,

or in the case of death his dependents, may claim
compensation and the injured employee or his heirs
or personal representative may also have an action
for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and the employer or insurance carrier
becomes obligated to pay compensation, the employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of
the cause of action against a third party, and may
bring or maintain the action either in its own name
or in the name of the injured employee or his heir or
the personal representative of the deceased, provided
the employer or the carrier may not settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the
commission.
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An analysis of the cases on the problem of immunity
from third party liability, which also analyzes the Utah
cases up to date is found in an extensive note in 9 Utah
Law Review, 939-960, Winter, 1965. That Law Review
article cites the 1963 case of Shirley D. Cook v. Peter
Kiewit Construction Company, a corporation, 1963, 15
Utah 2d 20, 386 P. 2d 616.
The opinion in that case indicates that the reasoning
approved by three members of the Court favored freedom
from third party liability in a case such as we have here.
Part of the well reasoned opinion written by Mr. Justice Crockett of the Court is as follows:
"In approaching the question here presented it is
well to keep in mind that the philosophy behind the
Workman's Compensation Act encompasses two
main objectives. The first is to assure that an employee who is injured in employment will have
necessary medical and hospital care and modest but
certain compensation for his injury, with resulting
benefits to himself, his family and to society generally, the other is to afford employers a measure of
protection against exorbitant claims for injuries"-.
"The language of the statute preserving an action
against ' ... third persons' who are 'not in the same
employment . . . ' seems plainly designed to apply to
strangers to the employment and not to co-workers
jointly engaged in the same endeavor. For example
an employee is working for a contractor in street construction when a passing motorist negligently injures
him. He is entitled to the workman's compensation;
and also to sue the motorist. This is logical and just,
because the fact that the plaintiff is covered by workman's compensation should give no protection to the
motorist who wrongfully injured him. But there is a
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ma~ke~, distinction ?etween that and the instant sit-

uation. ( 617) (I tahcs supplied for emphasis.)

"In reference to the Kiewit employees, he said that '
they ' ... worked with them fairly closely ... ' and
that he was directed where to drill by Kiewit engi.
neers." (618)
"The other important purpose of the Workman's ,
Compensation Act, which must be given recognition
and effect, is that it permits employers to pay fees
for workmen's compensation insurance thereby safeguard themselves against possible disastrous claims
for injuries which they may not be able to bear. This
also allows employers to so plan and manage their ,
affairs as to make the wheels of industry run, with
its resulting benefits, including jobs for employees,
both the giving of full effect to the act, and doing
justice to the employer; require that it be so interpreted and applied as to afford the employer the in·
tended protection as well as conferring the advantages it does upon the employee." (618) (Italics supplied.)
Mr. Justice Wade dissented on the ground that he did
not regard the affidavits as sufficient to show interrelated
control and supervision to a degree to support a summary
judgment. Mr. Justice Henroid similarly dissented.
The Cook decision, supra, established that the Utah Su·
preme Court does not hold to the quid pro quo theory for
determining co-contractor immunity from tort liability
for the injury to the employee of one contractor arising
from the negligence of a co-employee of another contrac·
tor working on the same project. Peter Kiewit Sons Com·
pany was not providing workmen's compensation cover·
age for employees of the co-contractor Crocker Construe·
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tion Company, Inc. AB stated by author Durrant in his
article on Thtrd Party Liability in 9 Ut. L. Rev. No. 4,
Winter, 1965, 939 at 957:
Having responsibility for compensation insurance
premiums (of the injured co-employee of another
contractor) does not seem to be an indispensible
factor under the Utah cases in determining whether
a contractor has tort immunity.
The reasoning of the Utah Supreme Court in the Cook
case is supported by twelve of the thirteen cases having
been written by other appellate courts.
The leading case of Thompson v. Kiester et. al., 1930,

141 Okla. 69, 283 P. 1018 is a case in point. Headnote 4

reads in part:

In determining whether or not the Industrial Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over an injured
employee, the fact that the one causing the injury,
was not liable to the injured party for compensation
under the act is not the determining factor.

Headnote 2 reads:
Where the owner of an oil and gas lease employes a
drilling contractor to furnish all the tools and labor
necessary for drilling an oil well, and agrees to pay
the sum of $100 per day therefor, and said person so
employed to drill the well injures the plaintiff, who
is an employee of a rig contractor, and said rig contractor is at the time employed by the owner to make
certain repairs upon the rig at the well that the defendants are drilling, both the drilling contractor and
the defendants are "in the same employ" as intended
by the Workmen's Compensation Act of this State.
The Court stated the legal test as follows 283 Pac. 1018,
1022:
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We do n_ot think that the ~rm "in the same employ,"
as used m the Compensation Act, was so limited that
both parties must be hired and working directly under the same person. If they are engaged in the same
general business . . . and for the same general em.
ployers, they are in the same employ as intended by
the act ...

1

In this Nauman case the architect and the contractor
and their respective employees are engaged in the
same general business and for the same employers .
the "Joint Authority".
Larson, Workmen's Compensation 1961, Vol. 2, Sec.
72.20, p. 173 writes:

72.20 Employer and co-employees immune. A number of states expressly exclude co-employees from
the category of "third persons". 14 (14. Among the ,
states in this group are Alabama, Colorado, New
York, Oregon and Utah.")
The right to compensation or benefits under this
chapter shall be the exclusive remedy to an employee, or in the case of death his dependants, when
such employee is injured or killed by the negligence
or wrong of another in the same employ.
It is now well established that the effect of this enactment is to bar all suits against co-employees by
injured employees or by subrogated employers. 16.
The same has been held in Virginia under a statute
immunizing the employer "or those conducting his
business". 17. . . although the opposite conclusion
was reached in North Carolina.

1

The 1965 supplement to the 1961 Volume by Larson
adds citations of twelve cases holding third parties and
their employees immune from tort liability because considered to be within the phrase "in the same employ-
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ment" or similar phrase in the Workmen's Compensation
Law. We quote further from Larson's volume:
For example, see Roberts v. Gagnon 1 App. Div. 2d,
297, 149 N.Y.S. 2d 743 (1956). Where the co-employee is immune from suit so is his principal. Otherwise the co-employee would not receive complete
protection because his principal, if found liable,
could recover from his agent, the co-employee.
The bar was held to apply when a milk collector was
assaulted by an employee of the dairy to which the
milk was brought, since employees of the two employers had to work together in weighing and emptying the cans at the dairy. Atkinson v. Farview Dairy
Farms, (Ore.) 222 P. 2d 732 (1950). Larson Sec.
72.34.
In support of the reasoning of the Utah Cook case,
supra, Larson cites cases from eight other states as follows:
Mayes v. Marshall Field & Co., 351 Ill. App. 329, 115
N.W. 2d 99 (1953); Worthington v. Industrial Commission, 85 Ariz. 310, 338 P. 2d 363 (1959); Saala v.
McFarland, 29 Ca. Comp. 306, 41 Cal. Rep. 530
(1964); Helmie v. Paine, 369 Mich. 114, 119 N.W. 2d
574 (1963); Lucas v. Biller, 204 Va. 309, 130 S.E.
2d 582 ( 1936) ; and several other cumulative cases on
varying fact situations.
In Zenchak v. Ryder Truck Rentals, Inc. 150 So. 2d
727 (Fla. 1963), the Court wrote:
The owner of the rental truck, leased to plaintiff's
employer and driven by a co-employee, was immune
from the common-law action. The owner was not vicariously liable under the dangerous-instrumentality
doctrine. The negligent lessee's driver was also the
plaintiff's (immune) co-employee.
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In Lucas v. Biller, 204 Va. 309, 130 S.E. 2d 582 (1963),
the Court wrote:
-whether the driver of the car in which the plaintiff was injured was a co-worker of an independent
contractor paid by their mutual employer to supply
transportation, the driver was engaged in the business of the plaintiff's employer at the time of the
accident. Common-law action against the driver dis- '
missed.
In Pettaway v. Mcconaghy, 367 Mich. 651, 116 N.W.
2d 789 (1963), the statute exempted "all natural persons who carry on the work of the employer, regardless of the type of activity performed. Therefore the
person who was the president, manager and sole
stockholder of the corporation was such an exempt
individual.

1

The continuing interrelation of the parties in this case
is, that Christiansen Brothers, Inc. and its employees and
Harold K. Beecher and Associates, a Utah corporation,
and its employees were all working for the same joint
owners, for the same purpose and to the same end-the
construction and the supervision of the construction respectively of the Metropolitan Hall of Justice Building.
The interrelated rights of control and supervision between the employees of the contractor and the architect,
although different in kind, existed daily and continuously
for several years.
The contractor and its employees were bringing materials and equipment for the building and the utility ,
tunnel, and constructing them into form according to 735
pages of detailed specifications drafted into the contract
by the architect. The architect and its employees were
daily watching and supervising to see that the materials
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and equipment were of the kind and quality specified,
and that the installation and construction into the designated structures conformed in result to those detailed
specifications.
Defendants respectfully submit that they qualify as
co-employees under Section 35-1-62 N.C.A. 1953, and the
reasoning of the Cook case supra and that the dismissal
of plaintiff's complaints should be affirmed on that
ground.
POINT VII
PLAINTIFF'S CASES ARE NOT IN POINT
Plaintiff cites five cases of misfeasance of architects
which are clearly inapplicable to an alleged claim for
non-feasance of claimed supervisory duties of an architect. Each case deserves analysis on its particular facts.
The general rule is stated by the Supreme Court of
Illinois in Miller v. DeWitt, infra, which, with two modifications added here in parenthesis, states the rule according to the few cases in this area, except for the late
New York cases, which are more restrictive in favor of
architect's non-liability.
As a general rule, it has been said that the general
duty to 'supervise the work' merely creates a duty to see
that the building when constructed (and while being
constructed) meets the plans and specifications contracted for (which call for construction without hidden
defects). Clinton v. Boehm, 124 N.Y. Supp. 789, 139 App.·
Div. 73; Garden City Floral Co. v. Hunt, 126 Mont. 537,
255 P. 2d 352, 356; Day v. U.S. Radiator Corporation, 241
La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660, 666.
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Plaintiff cites Montijo v. Swift, 1963, 219 Cal. App. 2d
351, 33 Cal. R. 133 (App. Brief p. 15) which is certainly
not in point with the instant case. That is clearly a case
of alleged misfeasance, not of non-feasance. The plaintiff
alleged that the architect had designed a plan and pr0vided specifications for a stairway that was interently unsafe and dangerous to invitees in a bus depot using the
stairway and exercising ordinary prudence in its use. The
facts alleging an unsafe condition were set out in detail.

1

,

1

The architect had designed and specified a stairway I
with a side wall and handrail which came one full step
short of the bottom landing. Plaintiff holding to the handrail and instinctively believing she was at floor level
when her hand reached the bottom of the handrail allegedly fell and was injured by reason of the faulty construction. The construction was done in accordance with
the allegedly faulty plans and specifications of the architect. The plan and specifications, and the construction
pursuant thereto, was found to be a semi-hidden defect
negligently planned and specified by the defendant arch·
itect, for which liability was affirmed. This case supports
defendants, not the plaintiff. There is no allegation of
defective plans and specifications in this Nauman case.
The latest case in New York would reach a different
result because the defect was observable and not a hidden
defect.
In the case of Inman v. Binghampton Housing Author·
ity et. al. 1957, 3 N.Y. 2d 137, 164 N.Y. Supp. 699, 143 N.E.
2d 895, 59 A.L.R. 2d 1072, plaintiff alleged negligence of
the architect in designing and providing specifications for
a too-short railing on a balcony and a too-narrow space
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between the door, when opened outward, and the railing,
by which allegedly a child was caused to fall over the
railing and was injured.
The Court, which has probably considered. more cases
against architects than any other state except perhaps
California, held:
Liability (of the architect) exists only for injuries
caused by hidden defects or concealed. dangers similar as is the law of responsibility of manufacturers.
The Court adopted the reasoning and rule for architects
as it exists for manufacturers today following "the famous decision" in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 1916,
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, which held defendant manufacturer liable for a hidden defect in a wooden automobile wheel which collapsed injuring plaintiff.
That case supports the defendants, not the plaintiff.
The New York rule of liability of architects for alleged
negligence in design and specifications is: IF THE DEFECT OR SITUATION IS PATENT, KNOWN OR DISCERNABLE BY REASONABLE INSPECTION THE INJURY RESULTING THEREFROM IS NOT ACTIONABLE. THE SITUATION HERE WAS PATENT,
KNOWN AND DISCERNABLE.
The New York Appellate Court wrote in Inman v.
Binghampton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y. 2d 137 The cases establish that the manufacturer of a machine or other article, "dangerous because of the way
in which it functions, and patently so, owes to . . .
(remote users) a duty merely to make it free from
latent defects and concealed dangers." (Campo v.
Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 471, 95 N.E. 2d 802, 803.) "We
have not yet reached the state," we wrote in the
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Campo case, supra, 301 N.Y. at pages 472-473, 95 N.E.
2d at page 804, "where a manufacturer is under the
duty of making a machine accident proof or fooJ. ,
proof." ... Suffice it to note that, in cases dealing
with a manufacturer's liability for injuries to remote
users, the stress has always been upon the duty of
guarding against hidden defects and of giving notice
of concealed dangers (cases cited). In point of fact
several of the cases actually declare that a duty is
owed, a liability is imposed, only if the defect or
danger be not "known" or "patent" or discoverable
"by a reasonable inspection". And, since the presence
of a latent defect or a danger not generally known is
precedent to the manufacturers' liability, the absence
of such a recital in the complaint is fatal to the ex. '
istence of a cause of action (against the architect).
Examination of the pleading before us discloses its
invalidity. It contains no allegation of any latent defect or concealed danger. It simply complains of (1)
the absence of a "protective railing, guard or any device,'' (2) the arc made by the door when opened,
and (3) the fact that the step did not extend full
length of the stoop, all patently obvious defects, if,
indeed, they are defects at all. From none of these
recitals may it be said that the architects or the
builder violated a duty owed to users of the stoop.
Entirely lacking, to paraphrase what we said in the
Campo case, supra, 301 N.Y. 468, 471, 95 N.E. 2d 802,
is any suggestion that the structure possessed a
latent defect or an unknown danger and, in the vecy
nature of things, entirely lacking is any recital that
the absence of a railing or other device was unknown
or undiscoverable. As we have already indicated,
such omissions are fatal.
I

Plaintiff cites the case of Clemens v. Benzinger, 1925,
311 App. Div. 586, 207 N.Y. Supp. 539 which again is not
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in point. This was a case of affirmative conduct of misfeasance by the architect in allowing defective amended
plans and specifications for anchoring steel "H" columns
for support of a grandstand. The original plans and specifications required anchor bolts to be set two feet deep
with steel horizontal flat flanges extending outward several inches to be set at the time the concrete was poured
to fasten the steel "H" columns securely in place.
It was discovered that this had not been done by the

contractor on alternate places where the concrete block
was poured onto which the "H" columns were to be
placed. At this point, the architect had the option of ordering the alternate concrete bases which now could not
allow fastening on anchor bolts removed and replaced
and that the contractor follow his safe plans and specifications as originally drawn, delivered and accepted by
the owner.
Instead of insisting that his safe plans and specifications be followed, the architect obviously yielded to argument and approved an amended or modified plan and
specification which allowed the contractor to drill holes
in the solid alternate concrete bases and insert therein
anchor bolts of less depth having no horizontal flange at
the bottom of each bolt as a safe anchor, and to allow the
contractor merely to grout in the drilled holes around the
bolts with sand and cement. The new plan and specification called for the protruding horizontal lugs to be removed. As a result of these affirmative acts of misfeasance of the architect, an "H'' column fell striking plaintiff's decedent and killing him.
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The negligence on which the Court found liability w,
not merely non-feasance in supervision by the archit as
It was the proximate result of his calculated affirrnat~t.
act in consenting to modify his original safe plans e
. t·ions to a p 1an and specification for anchorin
ana '
specifica
the particular "H" column which was unsafe and in~
1
herently dangerous as a hidden defect.
!
I

The case of Paxton v. Alameda County et. al., 1958, m
Cal. App. 2d 393, 259, P. 2d 932 is not in point for plaintiff. :
It is true that Alameda County was held responsible.
However, it was not held responsible for non-feasance
because the architect as the owner's agent (some cases
say independent contractor) failed to supervise as to the •
means or manner of nailing down the defective sheathing
on the roof which allowed the plaintiff workmen carry.
ing buckets of hot tar to fall through the roof and be
injured.
l

1
1

I

What happened in the Paxton case was that the arch·
itect saw inferior roof sheathing to that of his specifica·
tion lying on the ground next to the building, and he,
knowingly, recklessly and heedlessly, allowed the in·
ferior roof sheathing to be installed in violation of ~
duty to see that his plan and specification in this part1c·
ular detail, which would have insured safety for the
workmen on the roof, was followed. Alameda County was
held liable because of this misfeasance of the architect.
The complaint was rightly dismissed against the architect
because it merely charged as to him that his specification
called for an inferior, unsafe grade of sheathing and too
wide spacing of rafters which allegations were found un·
true.
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In briefing this case, Mr. Cassity inadvertently agrees
with defendant's position that the architect's duty is to
supervise to secure compliance with specifications in the
completed work. He writes:
The architect in that case had the contractural obligation to prepare the plans and specifications and to
direct and supervise the construction work ... to see
that the building was completed in strict accordance
with the plans and specifications therefore. (App.
Brief, p. 19)
The controlling difference is that in the Nauman case,
the architect did not make any plans and specifications
for the excavation. He had no right or authority to provide any plans or specifications for the general contractor to follow in making an excavation in which the
utility tunnel was to be constructed according to definite
plans and specifications for the utility tunnel.
HAD THE ARCHITECT DRAFTED PLANS AND

SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE EXCAVATION, THE
GENERAL CONTRACTOR WOULD HAVE BEEN
FULLY WITHIN HIS CONTRACT RIGHT AND
AUTHORITY TO TELL THE ARCHITECT TO
MIND HIS OWN BUSINESS.
Plaintiff cites loose dicta from the case of Cravt>lini

and Anderson Co. v. Scholer & Fuller Associated Arch-

itects, an Arizona corporation et. al., 1960, 89 Ariz. 24,
357 P. 2d 611. This case is not even remotely in point on
the Nauman case. The loose dicta quoted by plaintiff's
counsel is wholly out of context. The case was one in
which the contractors brought action against the architect and its two co-managers for conspiracy in intentionally, deliberately and maliciously undertaking to inter-
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fere with plaintiff's contract rights in the construction
contract in 14 particular ways set out in the complaint
in detail, and in deliberately undertaking to bankrupt
plaintiff to plaintiff's damages of $200,000.00 .

.

'Dhe Court stated that the defense of immunity of an
architect in acting as arbitrator under the contract must
be recognized, but that the complaint pleaded an ordinary tort action of malicious interference with contract by
co-conspirators which allegations stated facts far outside
the quasi-judicial function of the architect as an arbi- ,
trator and reversed for a new trial.
Plaintiff's counsel relies strongly on the reasoning of
the dicta of the Illinois intermediate appellate court in '
its lengthy opinion in the case of Miller v. DeWitt et. al.,
1965, 59 Ill. App. 2d 38, 208 N.E. 2d, 249. Suffice to say
the case rests on an extension of liability against architects created by the Structural Work Act (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1963, Chap. 48, par. 60, 69). Both the intermediate appellate court and the Supreme Court of Illinois (citation
to latter case not yet available) held that said act governed the case. The injuries to three plaintiffs resulted
from the collapse of tubular steel shoring which was
placed to support a part of the gymnasium roof, weighing
many tons, from which the steel trusses supporting the '
roof were to be removed to allow for a new extension of
the roof over an enlarged gymnasium. The Supreme
Court wrote:
Turning next to the counts alleging a violation of the
Structural Work Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, Chap. 48,
par. 60, 69) the architects contend that the sho~g
was not within the purview of the act, that there is
no evidence that the shores were inadequate, and

f
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that the architects were not "in charge of the work",
so as to be liable for plaintiffs' injuries. We have examined the record and we find that the opinion of
the appellate court adequately disposes of the first
two contentions holding that the shoring was within
the purview of the act and could be found to have
been inadequate.
Whether the architect came within the phrase in the
Structural Work Act as one "in charge of the work" depended on whether the work came within the tort doctrine of an ultrahazardous activity. (Rest. Torts, Sec.
520 et. seq.) Both courts found that removing the steel
supports from a gymnasium roof was an ultrahazardous
activity and the right granted the architect to stop work
became a duty under the particular circumstances.
The Supreme Court writes a long paragraph describing the known inherent danger of removing steel supports
from a multi-ton gymnasium roof and concludes:
The weight of the new roof could be computed from
the information shown on the plans; and by subtracting that figure from the total reaction shown on
the plans the weight of the old roof could be obtained.
The Supreme Court throughout its opinion emphasizes
that it is confirming its opinion to the particular facts of
the case, and that the jury may have misunderstood the
duty of the architect. The Supreme Court, in reversing
the case for a new trial, wrote:
Since this case is close on its facts, we believe the
failure to withdraw these allegations from the jury
permitted them to premise guilt on a false assumption of the architect's duties. We therefore feel that
a new trial must be granted.
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The Supreme Court of Illinois found that the general
agreement of the architect for supervision and a right to
stop work did not give the architect the right to interfere
with the methods, means or techniques of the independent contractor except in the ultrahazardous activity situation. It wrote:
We feel that except for the duty to stop work in the
event of an obviously hazardous dereliction of duty
on the part of the contractor, the architects were
under no duty with regard to the methods, means or
techniques used by the contractor to shore the roof.
Clinton v. Boehm, 139 App. Div. 73, 124 N.Y. S. 789,
791; Potter v. Gilbert, 115 N.Y.S. 425, at 428, (aff'd
by Court of Appeals 196 N.Y. 576); Olsen v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 10 App. Div. 2d 539, 205 N.Y.S.
2d 60, 65 (aff'd by Court of Appeals 9 N.Y. 2d 829,
215 N.Y.S. 2d 773, 774); Day v. National U.S. Radiator Corp. 241 La. 288, 128 S. 2d 660, 666; Garden City
Floral Co. v. Hunt, 126 Mont. 537, 255 P. 2d 352, 356;
Charles Meads & Co. v. City of New York, 191 App.
Div. 365, 181 N.Y.S. 704, 707.
The facts in the Napman case are entirely different
from those of the Miller case. There the contractor was
engaged in an ultrahazardous activity of removing steel
supports from a concrete gymnasium roof. Here the State
Industrial Commission inspector had inspected the open
excavation, found the shoring inadequate, stopped the
work, ordered definite and specific amount and kind of
shoring used which in the judgment of the State In·
dustrial Commission would comply with its Safety Reg·
ulations.
Here laos by official inspection of the State Industrial
Commission the pattern of shoring used by the contrac·
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tor from September 18, through October 4th was found
to be in compliance with Safety Regulations of the State
Industrial Commission for excavating an open trench.
A rule of presumption is that a condition shown to exist
is presumed to continue until facts show the contrary.
Clearly, the contractor would not shore the excavation in
an amount and kind appreciably greater than the pattern
of shoring twice approved over a two weeks period by the
State Industrial Commission's inspector.
POINT VIII
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT GRANTS ARCHITECT
ACTION OVER AGAINST THE CONTRACTOR.
The Illinois intermediate appellate court had held that
under the Structural Work Act the architect and the
general contractor were joint tort feasers and that the
architect could not recover contribution or exhoneration
against the general contractor.
The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed on this point
and followed the distinction between misfeasance and
non-feasance of architects which was clearly established
in the leading New York case of Potter v. Gilbert, supra,
in order to fix the ultimate liability on the person primarily liable - the general contractor.
One issue was whether the architect could have an action over against the contractor because of violation of
the protection allegedly granted the general contractor
by "Sections 5 and 11 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, Chap. 48, par. 138.5, 138.11).
Section 11 provides that compensation under the act,
"shall be the measure of the responsibility" of a cov-
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ered employer. Section 5 provides: "No common law
or statutory right to recover damages from the em.
ployer or his employees for injury or death sustained
by any employee while engaged in the line of his
duty as such employee, other than the compensation
herein provided, shall be available to any employee
who is covered by the provisions of this Act ...
On this issue the Supreme Court held:

I

1

I

We think that the jury could find that the contractor ,
was an active tort feasor while the architect's fault
was merely passive. We conclude that this is a proper
case for a third party complaint and that the trial
court erred in dismissing the architects' third party
complaint on motion . . .
I1
Thus, defendants contend, as they have in all three
trial briefs, that there is no case that decides in absence
of statute that an architect is liable for non-feasance in
a fact situation where the independent contractor has
absolute discretion as to means, methods and technique
of making a temporary excavation and regarding which
the architect has absolutely no authority or right to make
any plans or specifications which the contractor must
follow, and which activity does not come within the tort
doctrine of ultrahazardous activity.
POINT IX
ON FACTS IN THE RECORD, PLAINTIFF'S COM·
PLAINT DOES NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
Defendants contend that because of immunity as co·
employees, no valid complaint can be made against them.
Assuming, without admitting, that a valid complaint of
negligence for non-feasance could be drafted if the pat·
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tern of shoring had not been officially approved, still the
complaint would be fatally defective.
Plaintiff's complaint does not allege a duty of the architect according to the standard of professional learning,
skill and prudence of architects practicing in the vicinity,
nor any violation of that established standard of care by
the architect or any of its agents in performance of its
supervisory duties; both of which are necessary allegations. Bourie v. Spring Valley Water Co., 1908, 8 Cal. App.
588, 97 P. 530.
Bancroft Code, P. 1 Vol. 4, Section 2038 states that,
The facts from which the duty flows must be stated.
And, Note 11, p. 3536 states: The conditions - from
which the duty flows must be set forth in such way
that the court can draw the legal conclusion. Cases
in support are there cited.
38 Am. Jur. Section 258 reads:
The general theory of pleading for negligence - is
that the pleader must set forth the facts of his claim
with such certainty as to reasonably inform the other
party what is proposed to be proved in the case so
that the latter may have an opportunity to meet such
facts and prepare his defense.
Bancroft Code Pleading, Section 2041 reads:
It is not sufficient however, at least as against

demurrer or motion, to allege in general terms that
any injury was caused by the negligence of the defendant. - Negligence is not an act itself, but the
fact which defines the character of the act and makes
it a legal wrong.

Plaintiff simply alleges that there was a right of the
architect to stop work, if in the judgment of the architect
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along (not in cooperation with others and subject to con.
currence of. the City Engineer and the County Engineer)
the stopping of work was necessary to correct a situation
which allegedly did not comply with the Safety Regula.
tions of the State Industrial Commission. Evidently what
the State Industrial Commission approved as safe, Mr.
Cassity judged to be unsafe.
Plaintiff's complaint does not state any of the farts
or circumstances to support his legal conclusion that the
excavation was dangerous and unsafe causing an extreme
hazard to workmen or in what respect the excavation
failed to comply with the safety regulations of the Utah
State Industrial Commission. The facts in the record
show that the pattern of shoring was officially approved
by the State Industrial Commission (Affidavit P. 175177).
Plaintiff's complaint arbitrarily substitutes the judgment of plaintiff's counsel for the discretinary judgment
of the City Engineer, the County Engineer and the arch·
itect "acting in cooperation" on the matter. (Comp. R.
148).
Plaintiff's complaint does not plead facts showing an
ultrahazardous situation or condition which the Illinois
Supreme Court says is necessary to require work stop·
page. It clearly rests on the theory of res ipsa loquitur
and on the theory that because an accident happened, the
architect is an insurer or guarantor of the freedom of
workmen from an accidental injury. The proximate cause
of the accident is alleged as merely a conclusion from
hindsight rather than a statement of facts from which
forseeability of injury might result.

I
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Plaintiff recognizes in his pleading that the unusual
and extra-ordinary right to close down work is not that
of the architect alone but that the architect's contracts
require such extreme action to be done in cooperation
with the City and County Engineers (Comp. par. 8, R.
148) and under the superior supervision of the City Engineer and the County Engineers. (Architects Agreement,
par. 13, R. 161). Plaintiff does not alleged neglect of this
necessary concerted action.
In concluding, we quote from the early and leading
case of Potter v. Gilbert, 1909, 130 App. Div. 632, 115 N.Y.
Supp. 425, aff'd 1909, 169 N.Y. 576, 90 N.E. 1165, cited
by the Illinois Supreme Court with approval.
The plaintiff does allege that the architect prepared
unsafe plans and specifications, but there is no allegation that the collapse of the wall was owing to any
defect in this regard. It may well be that an architect,
acting under a contract with the owner, by which it
is his duty to supervise the construction of the building, who knowingly permits a departure from the
plans or specifications, would be liable to a party injured thereby, and that he would also be liable for
failing to condemn any improper work which he discovers; but there is no allegation that the architect

permitted a departure from the plans and specifications, or that he knew there had been a departure
therefrom in time to remedy the defect before the
collapse of the wall . . . and under this rule, the

charge is merely that the architect failed to exercise
due diligence in supervising the construction. (Italics
added.)
The allegation that it was the duty of the defendant

to condemn the wall is insufficient to show negli-

gence, for the reason that the facts from which the
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duty flowed are not set forth. At most then the complaint merely charges an om!ssion of duty on the part
of the architect while acting for his principal, the
owner, which constitutes only non-feasance for
which he may be liable to his employer, but is not
liable to third parties. (Italics added.)
If the architect were guilty of any affirmative act
which contributes to the accident, as by directing a
departure from the plans or specifications, or the use
of improper materials, or knowingly suffering such
departure from the plans or specifications, or such
use of improper materials, or failing to condemn improper work, he would doubtless be liable; but there
is no such charge made in the complaint. (Italics
added.)
Wherefore defendants pray that this Honorable Court
affirm the dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's complaints.
Respectfully submitted,
A. Ladru Jensen
Ronald C. Barker

Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents

